A methodology of project appraisal combining the criteria of economic feasibility, acceptability, and sustainability is developed and applied to Plan Sierra, a watershed development project in the Dominican Republic. Feasibility is measured by the change in sustainable income due to the project; acceptability by the change in average annual income for the present generation; and sustainability by the difference between changes in sustainable and average annual incomes. These three criteria may be achieved by schemes of tax and subsidy between project and non-project households and between present and future generations.
Including in project evaluation the dimensions of environmental impact assessment (EIA) and sustainable development assessment (SDA) not only places new constraints on project design, but also can help create new opportunities by enhancing the resource base for rural development initiatives. Projects with external costs and negative impacts on the welfare of future generations have led to the systematic undervaluation of costs associated with the use of natural capital in the project itself. Internalizing these costs in the project and forcing on the project a sustainability constraint clearly restrict the scope of feasible projects. New opportunities derive from the fact that potential gainers outside the project target population, either in space (externalities) or in time (sustainability), can be taxed of part of the gains which rural development projects may create for them. When transferral to the target households in the project under the form of subsidies, these taxes can help create incentives for households to engage in enterprises which would not otherwise be attractive to them. As a consequence, the scope for socially beneficial rural development may be enhanced.
The challenge in pursuing these possibilities is in the design of an evaluation methodology and in the implementation of rural development initiatives constructed on these principles. This is what we explore in this paper. We first develop a set of theoretical concepts to be used for the environmental appraisal of projects. We then apply them to the evaluation of Plan Sierra, a rural development and watershed management project in the Dominican Republic which seeks to reduce rural poverty, mitigate externalities created by soil erosion, and enhance sustainability. We conclude with recommendations for the successful implementation of such projects.
I. THEORETICAL CONCEPTS OF PROJECT EVALUATION FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Dimensions of project evaluation
For projects that make use of natural capital, project evaluation needs to be carried out in three dimensions that require separate accounting exercises: 3 i) Economic and financial assessment of projects (EFA): This is the traditional component of project appraisal. It is measured by the net present value (NPV) of the stream of benefits and costs-and by the internal rate of return (IRR)--of the project at market prices for the agents in the project. Benefits can include not only the commercial and use values of resources but also their option and existence values for the agents in the project. Financial assessment consists in verifying ability to repay the loan by the borrowing agencies.
ii) Environmental impact assessment (EIA): Focus is on the externalities created by the project, for instance on the non-target populations within the project area or in other regions, and on the internalization of these externalities. For projects that generate positive externalities, for instance reduction of a flow of pollution, pro-active EIA can be used to identify gains that can be taxed and transferred as subsidies to the project households in order to potentially achieve incentive compatibility with project goals.
iii) Sustainable development assessment (SDA): Focus is on intergenerational equity in the incidence of gains from the project. Sustainable development puts a constraint on the way in which the present generation of decision makers uses natural capital so that it does not predetermine future generations, as a consequence of its actions, to a level of welfare that is necessarily lower than that achieved by itself [11] . Since the sustainability constraint is a matter of ethics as opposed to efficiency (which is the case for EFA and EIA), creating acceptability of the sustainability constraint is a key issue for implementation.
These three dimensions of project appraisal can be combined by charging the externality and sustainability taxes to the private accounting of NPV in EFA. If there are price distortions or if the social discount rate is below the market Interest rate, these calculations can be done at social prices as well.
Project-level definition of sustainabili ty Several approaches have been pursued to implement the concept of sustainabili ty.
One is through the ethics of intergenerat ional welfare where disintereste d altruism across generations would imply behavior by the current generation as though there was a zero discount rate and no substitution between the welfare of successive generations.
Another is through an intergenerat ional fund where transfers through tax, capitalizati on of a fund, and subsidy can compensate future generations for the depletion of natural capital by the current generation and insure a constant flow of welfare [5] . Finally, sustainabili ty can be achieved through non-declini ng capital stocks, where the stock includes natural, man-made, and human capital [8] . In this paper, we use the concept of an intergenerat ional fund to establish which recommenda tions meet the criterion of sustainabili ty and, for those which do not, what is the level of taxation that would need to be imposed on the current generation.
Two concepts of time have been used to introduce the sustainabili ty criterion in project evaluation. The first looks at future time as continuous, that is, without introducing discontinuit ies from one generation of decision makers to the next [9] . The second, by contrast, breaks future time in lumps of 20 to 25 years that correspond to the succession of decision makers belonging to overlapping generations [11] . This second approach introduces the arbitrarines s of having to define the time lapse between generations . It has the advantage of allowing a generation of decision makers within its own time span to manage natural capital free of the sustainabili ty constraint, for as long as these resources are surrendered , at the end of their own generation, in such a shape as to insure sustainabili ty for the next generation of decision makers. This gives current decision makers the flexibility of eventually depleting resources in the short run to subsequentl y restore them at a sufficient level to achieve sustainabili ty. This clearly requires that a threshold of irreversibili ty in resource use has not been exceeded, and that whatever investment in restoration of the natural resource stock is necessary to achieve sustainabili ty will be made at the cost of the present generation. In the March 94 • following methodology, we combine the continuous time measurement 01 annual income with discreet separation of generations to define sustainability in terms of intergenerational equity.
The sustainability criterion in continuous time . In continuous time, the concept of sustainability implies that the flow of services derived from the use of natural capital must be constant year after year over an infinite time. horizon Afici that this flow of services is obtained at a constant price (if there is one). Constant quantity and price thus insure intertemporal equity among users, i.e.
sustainability. If there is no price involved, sustainability would require a constant yield or a constant level of income achieved in the project. The problem of sustainability originates in the fact that the present generation of decision makers derives an economic rent from the use of natural capital, and that this rent is being eliminated over time by the use which this generation makes of natural capital.
In Figure 1 , we analyze the concept of sustainability when it is the income derived from a plot of land that should be maintained over time. Yields fall as soil fertility is being gradually depleted, but there are substitutes to land as a source of income, in particular interest bearing savings accounts. The present value of the stream of annual incomes yt as seen from t = 0 and at a discount rate r is equal to NPV(yd. For any NPV, there always exists a corresponding constant annual income y such that:
which is the sustainability income.2 To achieve this income, users of the land pay a tax (or save) yt -y before t* and receive a subsidy (or dissave) y yt forever after. In Figure 1 , the tax levied on the land before t* is equal to area A while the subsidy to users of the land after t* is equal to area B. At discount rate r, NPV(A)= NPV(B).3 If land users always receive the net income y, and the tax collected before t* is invested at interest r, income sustainability has been achieved even though soil fertility is being depleted over time. Intergenerational equity obtains as the resource rent is equally shared among all generations of land users. If there are high interest earning opportunities, the sustainability income can beheld higher, and land can be depleted faster.
The sustainability criterion in intergenerational time
The other approach to implementation of the sustainability constraint consists in: (1) Calculating the present value NPVi of an intertemporal economic program that uses is the net present value of the program evaluated at time T.
The total income received by the first generation is the difference between these two values, both evaluated at t = 0: Yj = NPV(area OABT) = NPV -e-r7" NPV2.
We assume that there is no credit market on which the household can borrow against the terminal value of the assets in year T, and hence that only the flow of income during these T years enters in the definition of income. -By comparison, the sustainability income, when sustainability is defined in continuous generational time, is ri=(1 CrT)NPVI. In Figure 2 , if the first generation's income differs from the sustainability income, when the second generation takes over the sustainability income has been reduced to -17 2 = (1-e' T)NPV2..
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• If NPV1 > NPV2, the resource depletion tax to be paid at time 0 by the first generation to be transferred as a subsidy to the second generation is such that it must compensate the latter for its NPV loss. This tax is thus defined as:
where r is the interest rate at which the .tax paid by the present generation can be deposited until time T when it will be paid as a subsidy to the second generation. By transferring some income from year 0 to year T through tax, the net present value
NPVi does not change but the net present value at time T has increased to NPV2+ erT tax. The tax paid by the first generation is thus:
After tax, the level of income Yj achieved by the first generation is equal to:
This level of income is the same as the one that would be achieved when the Plan Sierra is an autonomous civil institution with some 400 employees and a budget initially principally derived from an annual appropriati on by the Dominican Congress to the national budget. The Plan focuses on a variety of economic activities including the promotion of ecologicall y stable. conucos, reforestatio n and thesustainable managemen t of existing forests, social forestry schemes, and diffusion of integrated systems of food crops and coffee. Important instruments for this purpose were the organizatio n of grassroots organizatio ns, infrastructu re developmen t, experimenta tion with new technologic al alternatives for sustainable conucos, credit schemes, the subsidized sale of tree seedlings, technical assistance, food-for-wo rk for the adoption of soil conservatio n. techniques, and training programs for community leaders and peasant households. On the social side, the Plan made important advances in the promotion of education with a concern for the ecology of the Sierra and implementa tion of an effective health program with extensive community participatio n. The Plan itself was organized with some highly innovative administrati ve mechanisms including the regional regrouping of technical support in a number of Poles of Developme nt scattered through the region, an intensively participator y internal process of decision making, close consultatio n with the local grassroots organization s, direct coordinatio n of many of the public services provided to the area, and a frequently revised internal schemes of assignment of responsibilit ies.
III. PRIVATE NET BENEFITS OF PLAN SIERRA
Plan Sierra offers households a set of alternatives to the current patterns of land use.
Analysis of the private benefits from Plan Sierra thus requires measuring the income gains from transitions from the current to the recommend ed activities.
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-11 -Economic analysis of the traditional cropping sequences
We start with an economic analysis of the private return to the different patterns of land use currently observed in the watershed. These are:
• unmanaged natural forest,
• pasture rented out,
• coffee under tree cover, and
• traditional conuco.
Among these, unmanaged natural forest is not an equilibrium system. Its very low return induces people to convert forests into different cropping systems, starting with slash-and-burn. Hence, for a farmer with access to forest land, three more potential cropping systems are added that give the opportunity cost of natural forests:
• slash-and-burn pasture,
• slash-and-burn conuco, and
• slash-and-burn coffee.
Each of these systems has to be analyzed in a dynamic fashion, as it is characterized by a sequence of land uses, yield levels, and maintenance activities. For example, the traditional conuco system consists in cycles of cultivation and fallow, with yields and lengths of cycles changing as the conuco ages. Similarly, the coffee system has a cycle of growth, maturity, and replacement of the trees. Hence, for each of these systems, the economic value is established from the sequence of annual incomes and expenses which have been calculated over one hundred years!' In Table 1 (Section A, Column 1), the net present value of benefits (NPVr) of each system is calculated at a 10% discount rate.5
Note that, for a farmer with access to a natural forest, the opportunity cost of his land is the highest present value of the different alternatives that are offered to him, i.e., keeping the natural forest, slash-and-burn pasture, slash-and-burn conuco, or slashand-burn coffee. From the reading of NPViu for traditional activities in Table 1 , we conclude that the maximum profitability is obtained with slash-and-burn conuco, followed by slash-and-burn coffee wherever it is ecologically possible. The fact that we observe slash-and-burn pastures, however, reflects the existence of other constraints that are not taken into account in a pure profitability calculation at the plot level as done here. A typical situation is that of absentee landlords (usually migrants to New York) who, because it may be difficult to conserve access to one's own land when it has been rented out, prefer to keep their land in direct production with extensive cattle raising supervised by a hired manager. For the farmers whose land is already in pasture, conuco, or coffee, the use of their land is assumed to be optimal for them and the opportunity cost of their land is the net-present value of the activity which they have chosen.
Economic analysis of the recommended transitions
Plan Sierra introduced a set of new alternatives for land use which are less erosive than traditional practices. The recommended transitions among sequences of land use are the following:
• from natural forest (and potential slash-and-burn activities) to managed forest,
• from pasture to coffee or planted forest,
• from traditional conuco to coffee or improved conuco.
Evaluation ofthe private economic worth of each of these transitions is made by comparing the stream of net income generated by the proposed alternative sequence with the stream of net income of the actual sequence. However, for the case of natural forest, the return of a proposed project of managed forest is compared to the opportunity cost of the unmanaged forest, not to the (very low and disequilibrium) return of maintaining this forest.
The improved conuco is the same cropping system traditionally used to produce food for home consumption and sale of the surplus, but it has been improved by (Table 1 , Section E) which shows that the highly profitable transitions to improved conuco, coffee, and managed forest largely compensate the cost of reforestation of pastures and the high opportunity cost of transitions from potential slash-and-bur n conuco to managed forest. The positive value of the NPV indicates that Plan Sierra is an economically viable project, even without accounting for the external benefits achieved through a decrease in land erosion. This is largely due to the very profitable technological and institutional innovations in conuco and forest management that were introduced by the project.
IV. SOCIAL NET BENEFITS OF PLAN SIERRA
Erosion from individual plots and Plan Sierra
The Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) was adapted to predict erosion corresponding to the different cropping systems and locations. The traditional conuco is the most erosive of the traditional systems, followed by pasture. Since the area dedicated to conuco has been falling, pasture is, in the aggregate, currently the major contributor to sedimentation. Managed natural forest has a higher erosion rate than planted forest or recommended conuco. The explanation is that most of the remaining natural forests are in lands with a higher propensity to erosion than pasture land, which is the primary land to be planted with forest, Among the array of externalities generated by erosion, we only consider the effect of erosion on siltage of the Bao reservoir and its consequences in reducing hydroelectrical power generation and water for irrigation in the valley downstream. We assess the "social" value of a change in upstream land use patterns by the value generated by the water storage space saved in the reservoir. This analysis has three * components: evaluation of the relationship between soil erosion and sedimentation of the reservoir, determination of the length of useful life of the dam, and estimation of the unit value of water in terms of electricity production and irrigation.
Delivery of sedimentation to the reservoir and useful life of a dam
In order to relate soil erosion upstream to sedimentation of the Bao reservoir, we need to estimate the long term sediment delivery ratio (SDR, the proportion of erosion generated in any specific year that will ultimately reach the reservoir) and the fraction of erosion that reaches the reservoir within one year (a, the short term delivery ratio).
Based on comparative data with other reservoirs [10] and on measurements of sediment delivery by Rocheleau [6] , we estimated these values at SDR = 50% and a = 0.195.
If the amount of sediments delivered decreases exponentially at a fixed rate r, the share of erosion that will have reached the reservoir t years after its production is a(1-/1(l-r). The proportion of erosion that will eventually reach the reservoir when t is SDR = a 1(1 -r). This yields a value of r = 0.61. With these numbers, it takes about 17 years for 50% of the erosion to have reached the reservoir, the *maximum that will ever arrive. We have estimated that 50% of the sediments delivered to the reservoir in 1989 came from non-agricultura l sources.
To calculate the useful life of the dam based on this sedimentation pattern, let A. / be the sediments emitted from the upstream region in year j (in tons). The weight of , . sediments that will reach the dam in year t is thus Aj a r`-) Consequently, the total volume of sediments reaching the reservoir every year is a function of current erosion and of past erosion history:
-17-where vi is the volume of sediments reaching the reservoir in year t (in m3), k = 1.3 is the conversion factor from ton to m3, and to is the initial year, which should be at least 17 years prior to the beginning of the dam.
• The accumulated volume of sediments in the reservoir in year t is then:
I where pv is the annual economic value generated by 1m3 of storage space in the reservoir. The economic value of space in the reservoir is determined by the irrigation and electrical power generation capacity which it provides. Note that lin3 of space in the reservoir is not equivalent to 1m3 of water per year, since each m3 of space will be filled and emptied several times per year, depending on the patterns of rainfall and -18 -outflow of water from the reservoir. Hence a model of the dam's operation is needed to estimate the annual volume of irrigation water wi and the electrical power we generated by one m3 of reservoir space.6
The value of irrigation water, pi , is the economic value generated by 1m3 of water in irrigation, in this case for the production of rice. It can be computed from the differentia l profitabilit y of irrigated and dry land rice. Similarly, the value pc of the electrical power generated from the dam operation is based on the cost of producing the same electricity with the alternative source used in the country. In this case, the alternative to hydroelectr icity is electricity produced from petroleum. Since both rice and oil are imported, pi and pc are function of the exchange rate (e). (Table 1, Section C, Column 3).
Turning to the criterion of sustainability, we see that the NPV of the dam is lower for.the future generation ( NPV6 21) than it is for the present generation (NPVid). This is because a dam, without dredging, is not a renewable resource. Larger benefits are captured in the first 20 years of operation when the reservoir has little siltage. By extending the useful life of the dam, the contribution of Plan Sierra is more than four times larger for the future generation, with an NPV of RD$10.96 million, than it is for the current generation (Table 1 , Section C, Column 5). This underscores the role of Plan Sierra in improving the sustainability of the dam. As a project for the downstream, Plan Sierra thus clearly passes the test of sustainability.
Externality of a single activity and transition
The downstream value of any specific reduction of erosion upstream depends on the life-time TD of the dam, which itself depends on the global reduction of erosion. Hence the value of any specific transition depends on the overall magnitude of Plan Sierra interventions. Considering, however, that none of the specific transitions by itself affects the overall lifetime of the project, the NPV of each transition can be written: TD . NPVd(at TD given) = Idtp,(W-VI). 1=1
In addition, when the dam's lifetime is kept constant, the contributions of all the different actions contributing to the reduction of erosion are additive. This is because the volume of sedimentation V1 is the sum of the sediments delivered from the different sources of erosion.
We estimated the NPVd for each activity and transition numerically by calculating
(1) the erosion with Plan Sierra and (2) the erosion with Plan Sierra minus one hectare of the activity or with one hectare going through one of the prescribed transitions. The
NPVd is calculated both for the present generation (NPVid in Table 1 , Column 3) and for the next generation starting T years later (NPV1 in Column 5). Looking first at the traditional activities one at a time, we see that they are all privately profitable upstream for the present generation (acceptability), which is expected since they would otherwise not be practiced (Table 1 , Section A, Column 8).
Comparing private profitabilities reveals the great attractiveness of S&B conuco over all other alternatives. All the traditional activities create negative externalities March 94 downstream, with S&B conuco the main source of emission on a per hectare basis (Section A, Column 9). This reveals the conflict between private upstream interests that draw households toward slash-and-burn for food and the social downstream interests for whom this is the pattern of land use with the greatest external cost. Notice, however, that the external losses are small compared to private gains, and these externalities could easily be internalized, were it not for the fact that upstream people are poor. We see that the conuco and pastures do not meet the sustainability constraint.
upstream (Section A, Column 10). By contrast, natural forest and S&B coffee are sustainable, the first because it produces constant yield with no front end costs, the second because the set up costs have been incurred by the first generation, thus benefiting more the second. None of the traditional activities are sustainable in terms of externalities as the costs of these externalities are higher for the second generation than they are for the first (Section A, Column 11). Patterns of wins and losses are thus as follows:
Slash-and-bun coffee 
Again, compensatio n for losses is feasible. In the case of planted forest, compensatio n has to be from future generations to the present generation, which raises interesting institutional questions for implementat ion that we discuss below.
Looking at the transitions recommende d by Plan Sierra, we see that neither a managed forest when the opportunity cost is a S&B conuco, which applies particularly to the smaller farmers and sharecropper s, nor the reforestation of pastures are feasible (their IRR are less than 10%). The patterns of wins and losses are as follows:
Pasture to planted forest and S&B conuco to managed forest
In both cases, wins are inferior to losses (infeasibilit y), making any scheme of compensatio ns to achieve acceptability impossible. This is particularly serious in the case of natural forest whose opportunity cost is S&B. If there forests are to be protected, other justification s need to be found than the private and external gains calculated here. Since taxation of gains for subsidy schemes is impossible, either prohibition or an influx of external resources are needed.
Most of the recommende d transition s-S&B pasture to forest, pasture to coffee, conuco to coffee, and conuco to improved conuco-are four-way wins and thus not problematic to implement. These projects are -feasible, acceptable, and sustainable.
However, constraints on adoption of these transitions by households may need to be relaxed, such as sufficient access to credit, insurance, and delivery of technical assistance by Plan Sierra.
Transfers are needed in two other transitions. For the transition from unmanaged to managed forest, small downstream externalities for both generations can easily be compensated, each by the corresponding generation, given the high profitability of the switch to forest management. The transition from S&B coffee to managed forest has a payoff matrix as follows:
In this case a sustainability tax needs to be imposed on present users to compensate the next generation, a tax which can easily be paid.
Finally, Table 1 , Section E gives the environmental appraisal of Plan Sierra's activities in the Bao watershed in terms of the planned schedule of recommended transitions. We see that the project is easily feasible, but that it creates losses for the present generation, and thus lacks acceptability as a project for upstream households.
This is because the introduction of new activities year after year creates high start-up costs. External gains captured by the present generation are not sufficient to compensate for these upstream losses. Compensation would thus need come from the future generations to compensate the present generation for initiating activities which are highly sustainable, but not to its own benefit. The payoff matrix for Plan Sierra is thus as follows:
Plan Sierra, Bao watershed
It would thus be logical for future generatio ns to subsidize the current generatio n, in order to induce it to undertake the recommen ded transition s.
VI. IMPLIC ATIONS FOR PROJEC T DESIGN
We found that, while diffusion of some activities requires active manageme nt through taxes and subsidies if they are to be adopted, most of the recommen ded practices are privately profitable , generate significan t social gains, and both upstream and social gains are easily sustainab le over several generatio ns. Watershe d manageme nt increases the downstre am value of the dam. For the first generatio n, it increases NPV from the dam by 1.4% and for the second generatio n by 9.3%. Because, short of dredging, a dam is a nonrenew able resource, external gains from watershed manageme nt will ultimately disappear as the economic value of the reservoir vanishes, but not before having generated significan t gains for the downstre am household s.
Implemen ting the recommen ded transition s when they are not directly feasible, -2.6 - 5 We follow here the tradition of Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier [5] in using consistently the financial interest rate as the discount rate. Prices are adjusted to their
shadow equilibrium values and the sustainability condition imposed explicitly as opposed to seeking to account for it through an adjustment of the discount rate. Use of different discount rates would evidently affect the intertemporal structure of each sequence (see [1] ). Here, we assume that these sequences have been optimally determined at the 10% discount rate. 6 Jorge [3] estimated values of wi and we with the simulation model MODSIM developed by the University of Colorado, using data from the Valdesia Dam which is adjacent to Bao and has similar characteristics.
7 We use average annual incomes over a generation instead of total generational incomes because the lengths of crop cycles differ and we do not always reach a completed cycle in year 20. We make generational cutoffs coincide with the end of cycles closest to 20 years.
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